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Appellant, Allen F. Grazer ("Grazer and/or "Appellant"), pursuant
to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure respectfully submits
this Brief on Appeal.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(j) as a case "transferred to the
Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court."
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court improperly grant the Partial Summary Judgment
of the Olsen Trust and deny the Motion of Grazer for Partial Summary
Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions by ruling that
in attempting to redeem the property at issue herein (the "Property"), the
Olsen Trust "need only substantially comply with the procedures of Rule
69C(c) for their [sic] redemption attempts to succeed," and further
ordering that Grazer execute a Certificate of Redemption upon the
payment to him of the redemption price of $210.00 by the Olsen Trust?
9

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case is an appeal from Judge Allphin's order granting partial
summary judgment in favor of the Olsen Trust. The trial court's ruling is
reviewed for correctness without according deference to its legal
conclusions. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52. Since a
summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, an
appellate court is free to reappraise a trial court's legal conclusions.
Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 751 P. 2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW
In reviewing the rights of parties to redeem and the procedures with
which the redeeming party must comply, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that:
The right of redemption is a "substantive right to be exercised in
strict accord with statutory terms." (Footnote omitted). Not only is
the right of redemption substantive, but also we have stated that the
procedures for redemption often confer substantive rights.
Generally, therefore, when the procedure at issue affects the
substantive rights of the parties, the procedure should be followed
strictly in order not to interfere with these rights.
Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1991).
Grazer asserts that his substantive property title rights are affected by
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Olsen Trust
10

and the denial of Grazer's the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in
which the court ruled the redemption attempt of the Olsen Trust on July 8,
2008 was valid. This ruling prevents Grazer from obtaining a sheriffs
deed to the Property and taking title to the Property. Grazer further
asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the Olsen Trust to only
"substantially comply" with the requirements of the redemption statute
and rules governing redemption rather than requiring strict compliance
with each requirement as listed in Rule 69C.
Finally, the trial court held that the Olsen Trust need only pay the
amount of paid only the amount of $210.00, the purchase price plus the
premium provided under Rule 69C(e). However, in addition to the
purchase price, "[I]n connection with the sale of the subject property, real
property costs of sale in the total amount of $2,178.02 were incurred and
have been paid to the Davis County Sheriffs Office" by Grazer. (R.
6463). That amount was itemized in a Notice of Amounts Paid and Owed
filed with the Salt Lake County Recorder on July 9,2008 as Entry No.
2378599, in book 4570, at Page 1039-41 (the "Notice"), prior to the
expiration of the redemption period on July 15, 2008 and should be
included in the price to redeem required to be paid under Rule 69C. The
11

Notice further claimed $2,700 for the "reasonable use and occupation" of
the Property by Defendant Gordon A. Jones and/or those under his
direction and control (collectively "Jones") as allowed under Utah R. Civ.
P.y Rule 69C(i). (R. 6463).

STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
The process by which a property may be redeemed by is governed
by Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-906 and set forth in Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 69C.
78B-6-906. Right of redemption — Sales by parcels — Of land and
water stock.
(1) Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and
liens are subject to redemption as in case of sales under executions
generally.
(2) In all cases where the judgment directs the sale of land, together
with shares of corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used,
intended to be used, or suitable for use, on the land, the court shall
equitably apportion the water stock to the land. If the court divides the land
into individual parcels for sale, the water stock may also be divided and
applied to each parcel. The land and water stock in each parcel shall be
sold together, and for the purpose of the sale shall be regarded as real estate
and subject to redemption as previously specified.
(3) In all sales of real estate under foreclosure the court may determine
the parcels and the order in which the parcels of property shall be sold.
Rule 69C. Redemption of real property after sale.
(a) Right of redemption. Real property may be redeemed unless the estate
is less than leasehold of a two-years1 unexpired term, in which case the
sale is absolute.
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(b) Who may redeem. Real property subject to redemption may be
redeemed by the defendant or by a creditor having a lien on the property
junior to that on which the property was sold or by their successors in
interest. If the defendant redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and
the defendant is restored to the defendant's estate. If the property is
redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption
may redeem.
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount
required to the purchaser and shall serve on the purchaser:
(c)(1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the
redemptioner claims the right to redeem;
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish the
claim; and
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien.
(d) Time for redemption. The property may be redeemed within 180 days
after the sale.
(e) Redemption price. The price to redeem is the sale price plus six
percent. The price for a subsequent redemption is the redemption price
plus three percent. If the purchaser or redemptioner files with the county
recorder notice of the amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance,
maintenance, repair or any lien other than the lien on which the
redemption was based, the price to redeem includes such amounts plus six
percent for an initial redemption or three percent for a subsequent
redemption. Failure to file notice of the amounts with the county recorder
waives the right to claim such amounts.
(f) Dispute regarding price. If there is a dispute about the redemption
price, the redemptioner shall within 20 days of the redemption pay into
court the amount necessary for redemption less the amount in dispute and
file and serve upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the items to
which the redemptioner objects and the grounds for the objection. The
13

petition is deemed denied. The court may permit discovery. The court
shall conduct an evidentiary hearing and enter an order determining the
redemption price. The redemptioner shall pay to the clerk any additional
amount within seven days after the court's order.
(g) Certificate of redemption. The purchaser shall promptly execute and
deliver to the redemptioner, or the redemptioner to a subsequent
redemptioner, a certificate of redemption containing:
(g)(1) a detailed description of the real property;
(g)(2) the price paid;
(g)(3) a statement that all right, title, interest of the purchaser in the
property is conveyed to the redemptioner; and
(g)(4) if known, whether the sale is subject to redemption.
The redemptioner or subsequent redemptioner shall file a duplicate of the
certificate with the county recorder.
(h) Conveyance. The purchaser or last redemptioner is entitled to
conveyance upon the expiration of the time permitted for redemption.
(i) Rents and profits, request for accounting, extension of time for
redemption.
(i)(l) Subject to a superior claim, the purchaser is entitled to the rents of
the property or the value of the use and occupation of the property from
the time of sale until redemption. Subject to a superior claim, a
redemptioner is entitled to the rents of the property or the value of the use
and occupation of the property from the time of redemption until a
subsequent redemption. Rents and profits are a credit upon the redemption
price.
(i)(2) Upon written request served on the purchaser before the time for
redemption expires, the purchaser shall prepare and serve on the requester
a written and verified account of rents and profits. The period for
14

redemption is extended to five days after the accounting is served. If the
purchaser fails to serve the accounting within 30 days after the request,
the redemptioner may, within 60 days after the request, bring an action to

compel an accounting. The period for redemption is extended to 15 days
after the order of the court.
(j) Remedies.
(j)(l) For waste. A purchaser or redemptioner may file a motion
requesting the court to restrain the commission of waste on the property.
After the estate has become absolute, the purchaser or redemptioner may
file an action to recover damages for waste.
(j)(2) Failure to obtain property.
(j)(2)(A) A purchaser or redemptioner who fails to obtain the property or
who is evicted from the property because the judgment against the
defendant is reversed or discharged may file a motion for judgment
against the plaintiff for the purchase price plus amounts paid for taxes,
assessments, insurance, maintenance and repair plus interest.
(j)(2)(B) A purchaser or redemptioner who fails to obtain the property or
who is evicted from the property because of an irregularity in the sale or
because the property is exempt may file a motion for judgment against the
plaintiff or the defendant for the purchase price plus amounts paid for
taxes, assessments, insurance, maintenance and repair plus interest. If the
court enters judgment against the plaintiff, the court shall revive the
plaintiff s judgment against defendant for the amount of the judgment
against plaintiff.
(j)(2)(C) Interest on a judgment in favor of a purchaser or redemptioner is
governed by Utah Code Section 15-1-4. Interest on a revived judgment in
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant is at the rate of the original
judgment. The effective date of a revived judgment in favor of plaintiff
15

against defendant is the date of the original judgment except as to an
intervening purchaser in good faith.
(k) Contribution and reimbursement. A defendant may claim contribution
or reimbursement from other defendants by filing a motion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L Nature of the Case
Grazer asserts that the Order of the trial court holding that Ludvig
D. Olsen and Jackie M. Olsen, Trustees of the Ludvig D. Olsen and Jackie
M. Olsen Trust (the "Olsen Trust") "need only substantially comply with
the procedures of Rule 69C(c) for their [sic] redemption attempts to
succeed" was error and that the redemption attempts of the Olsen Trust
were invalid. In light of that error, the ruling should be reversed,, and this
matter should be remanded with instructions to have a sheriffs deed
issued to Grazer.
IL Course of Proceedings
a.

On January 17, 2007, the property at issue herein and which

the Olson Trust attempted to redeem (the "Property") was sold at sheriffs
sale pursuant to a Writ of Execution issued November 8,2007. (Record
on Appeal ("R.") 6140 -46).
16

b.

Appellant/Grazer was the successful bidder for $ 191.00. (R.

6440).
c.

Grazer paid an additional amount of $2,178.02 in costs of

sale allowed under Rule 69C. (R. 6463).
d.

On or about July 3,2008 Gordon A. Jones, individually, in

his capacity as sole proprietor of Gordon Jones Construction and in his
capacity as a member of Gordon Jones Construction, L.C. and Linda G.
Jones, Individually and in her capacity as a member of Gordon Jones
Construction, L.C. assigned their right to redeem the Property to the Olsen
Trust pursuant to an Assignment of Redemption Rights filed with the
Court on July 11, 2008 (the "Assignment"). (R. 6269 - 6273).
e.

On or about July 7,2008, Renae C. Barney as personal

representative of the estate of Richard H. Barney, individually and in his
capacity as a member of Gordon Jones Construction, L.C. assigned the
rights of the Estate of Richard H. Barney to redeem the Property to the
Olsen Trust pursuant to the terms of the Assignment (Id.).
f.

On July 8, 2008, the Olson Trust tendered the amount of

$210.00 as the redemption price. (R. 6837).
g.

The tender was rejected on July 8, 2008 by letter from
17

counsel for Grazer on the grounds that counsel was not authorized to
accept service on Grazer's behalf, that the check was made payable to
counsel rather than Grazer. Counsel indicated that Grazer lived in
Colorado and that he would attempt to contact Grazer regarding the
redemption attempt by the Olsen Trust and that he would reserve
objections to the Olsen Trust's tender until the documents and check were
properly served. (R. 6440-41).
h.

On July 8, 2008, prior to the expiration of the redemption

period, Grazer recorded the Notice showing amounts he claimed as paid
and owed as required under Rule 69C (the "Notice"). (R. 6463).
i.

Counsel for the Olson Trust "became aware of the Notice on

or about July 15, 2008," prior to the expiration of the redemption period.
(R.6303).
j.

On July 14, the Olsen Trust was notified by counsel for

Grazer that "you have failed to pay the amounts for liens asserted on
behalf of Mr. Grazer pursuant to Rule 69C(e)." (R. 6431).
k.

The redemption period expired on July 15, 2008. Utah R. Civ

P., Rule 69C(d).
1.

On July 16, 2008, the Olson Trust filed a Request for
18

Accounting of Rents and Profits ("Request") asking for a written and
verified account of rents and profits with respect to the Property during
the redemption period. (R. 6274-77).
m.

On July 16, 2008, counsel for Grazer filed an Objection and

Response to Request for Accounting of Rents and Profits ("Objection")
on the grounds that the Request was untimely, not properly served and an
attempt to improperly extend the redemption period. (R. 6278-82).
n.

On August 15,2008, one month after the expiration of the

redemption period, the Olsen Trust filed a Petition for Establishment of
Redemption Price. (R. 6302-06)
o.

In connection with the Petition, the Olsen Trust tendered to

the Court a check in the amount of $2,465.00, which it asserted, at that
time, to be the correct redemption amount for the Property. (R. 6304).
p.

Grazer filed a Motion to Strike the Petition for Establishment

of Redemption Price on the grounds that the Petition had not been filed
within the time limits of Rule 69C (within 20 days after the redemption),
and was, therefore, untimely and invalid. (R.6316-19).
q.

On December 12, 2008, the Court issued a ruling granting

Grazer's Motion to Strike the Petition for Establishment of Redemption
19

Price on the grounds that the Petition was untimely. The Court noted that
the ruling did not preclude the Olson Trust from later moving that
redemption had occurred on its prior attempts of July 8 and July 10,2008.
(R. 6438-53, 6451-52).
r.

On December 31, 2008, Grazer filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions (R.
6454 - 6466).
s.

The Olsen Trust responded with a Cross Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment dated February 9, 2009. (R. 6473 - 6509).
t.

On May 5, 2009, the trial court heard Cross Motions for

Summary Judgment, ruled that the Olsen Trust's redemption attempt was
valid and that the Olsen Trust "need only substantially comply with the
procedures of Rule 69C(c) for their [sic] redemption attempts to succeed."
Ruling on Motions Pending at May 5, 2008 Hearing (the "Ruling"), p. 15.
(R. 6941).
u.

On August 28,2009, the trial court,

v.

entered an Order reflecting its Ruling stating,

On July 8, 2008, the Olsen Trust substantially complied with the
redemption procedures of Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure when it provided Defendant's counsel, who was acting
20

on behalf of his client, with (a) a copy of the Assignment; (b) a
check made payable to Plaintiffs counsel in the amount of $210;
and (c) a certificate of redemption.
[Proposed] Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on
Redemption ("Order") f 3 (R. 6971-74,6972).
w.

The Court ordered that Grazer be paid the sum of $210 after

the receipt of which Grazer "shall promptly execute and deliver to the
Olsen Trust a certificate of redemption in accordance with Rule 69C(g) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." {Id.).
x.

In that same ruling, Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions was denied.
Order. (Id.).
y.

Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal on September 18,

2009. (R. 6975).
HL Disposition in Court Below
A Final Judgment from which this Appeal is taken was entered as
an "Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on Redemption" by
the Honorable Michael G. Allphin dated August 28, 2009 (the "Order").
The Court ruled that the attempted redemption by the Olson Trust on July
8, 2008, substantially complied with the procedures of Rule 69C(c) and
21

was a valid redemption by the Olson Trust. The Court further ordered
that the $210.00 amount originally tendered by the Olson Trust was the
proper redemption price to be paid to Grazer. The Order was certified by
the Court as Final as to all claims involving the attempted redemption by
The Olsen Trust The Property had been sold at sheriffs sale on January
17,2008 (the "Sheriffs Sale"). Grazer's Notice of Appeal was filed with
the Clerk of the Second District Court of Davis County, Farmington
District, State of Utah on September 16,2009.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Pursuant to a writ of execution dated November 8, 2007, the

Davis County Sheriff sold all of Gordon A. Jones' ("Jones") and the
estate of Richard H. Barney's ("Barney") interest in certain real property
located in Davis County, Utah (the "Property"), to the highest bidder at a
sheriffs sale on January 17, 2008. Petition [of the Olsen Trust] for
Establishment of Redemption Price dated August 15, 2008 f 1. (R. 6302).
2.

Grazer was the highest bidder at the sheriffs sale and

purchased the Property for $191.00. Id. f 2. {Id.). (R. 6303)
3.

On or about July 7, 2008, Jones and Barney executed an

Assignment of Redemption Rights ("Assignment") assigning their right to
22

redeem the Property (pursuant to Rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure) to the Olsen Trust. Id f 3. (R.6302-03).
4.

By letter dated July 8, 2008, counsel for the Olsen Trust

delivered a copy of the Assignment and tendered a check to Lincoln W.
Hobbs, attorney for Grazer in the underlying action ("Hobbs"), for a
redemption price the Olsen Trust alleged to be the amount of $210.00
(which covered the $191.00 purchase price of the property plus 6% annual
interest accruing since the date of the sheriffs sale). The letter also
requested that Grazer execute and return an enclosed Certificate of
Redemption pursuant to subsection (g) of Rule 69C. Id. f 4. (R. 6303).
See also, Exhibit "B " to Response to Motion to Strike Petition for
Establishment of Redemption Price dated September 25, 2008. (R. 638788, 6390).
5.

The July 8, 2008 letter did not include a certified copy of the

judgment which the Olsen Trust claimed the right to redeem or an
affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien as required
under Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id)
6.

On the same date, July 8, 2008, the check and the documents

submitted were returned to counsel for the Olsen Trust on the grounds that
23

Hobbs had not been authorized to accept service or payment on behalf of
Grazer. The letter returning the check and the documents also indicated
"Also, I am rejecting the tender of the check payable to me, for the
redemption of property owned by my client. That is clearly not
appropriate and I [Hobbs] intend to insist upon strict compliance in your
clients' attempted transfer of the redemption rights." Exhibit "C" to
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Petition for
Establishment of Redemption Price dated October 12, 2008. (R. 6429)
7.

The July 8, 2008 letter from counsel for Grazer further

stated, "[I] will reserve my objections to your tender until the documents
and check are appropriately served." (Id.).
S.

On July 9, 2008, Grazer recorded a Notice of Amounts Paid

and Owed (the "Notice") with the Office of the Davis County Recorder in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 69C(e). The Notice was recorded
with the Office of the Davis County Recorder as Entry No. 2378599, in
Book 4570 at Pages 1039-41.] Notice, Exhibit "A " to Memorandum in

1

Rule 69C(e) provides that "Failure to file notice of the amounts with the
county recorder waives the right to claim such amounts [for taxes,
assessments, insurance, maintenance, repair or any other lien other than
the lien on which the redemption was based]." Although Rule 69C does
24

Support of Defendant Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions. (R. 6463)
9.

The Notice itemized expenses Grazer claimed as purchaser in

connection with the sale of the Property:
1.
In connection with the sale of the subject property,
real property costs of sale in the total amount of $2,178.02 were
incurred and have been paid to the Davis County Sheriffs Office.
2.
Upon information and belief, the property has been
used since the date of the sale by the original judgment debtor
Gordon A. Jones and/or those under his direction and/or control;
the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property
during the ensuing five and one-half months since the date of the
sale is $2,750 calculated at the rate of $500.00 per month for five
and one-half months.
Notice. {Id.).
10.

On July 10,2008, the Olsen Trust attempted to redeem the

property a second time. The Olsen Trust delivered to Grazer's counsel a

not specify a time deadline during which the notice for such amounts must
be filed, reading the Rule, as a whole, would indicate that the purchaser
has the same 180 days to file such notice as the redemptioner has to
redeem the property. Cf Sentry Investigations, Inc., v. Davis, 841 P.2d
732 (Utah 1992)(Terms of a statute should not be interpreted in a
piecemeal fashion, but as a whole. "[A] fundamental principle of statutory
construction is that a statute should be construed as a whole, and its terms
should be construed to be harmonious with each other and the overall
objective of the statute." (Citation omitted).
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copy of the Assignment, a check payable to Grazer in the amount of $210,
and a Certificate of Redemption for execution. (R. 6441),
11.

In making the July 10, 2008 redemption attempt, the Olsen

Trust, again, did not serve a certified copy of the Judgment or an affidavit
showing the amount due on the judgment or lien as required under Rule
69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See id).
12.

By letter dated July 14, 2008, Grazer indicated that he would

not execute the Certificate of Redemption and filed a complaint against
Jones, Barney, and the Olsen Trust alleging, among other things, that the
Assignment was a fraudulent transfer in violation of the Utah Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. Petition [of the Olsen Trust] for Establishment
of Redemption Price dated August 15, 2008 f 5. (R. 6303)
13.

On or about July 15, 2008, counsel for Jones and Olsen

became aware that Grazer had recorded the Notice. Id. f 6. (R. 6303)
14.

On July 15, 2008, the 180 day redemption period allowed

under Rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expired. Utah R.
Civ. P., Rule 69C(d).

The year 2008 was a leap year, adding a day to be taken into
consideration in the 180 day calculation.
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15.

On or about July 16, 2008, the Olson Trust filed a Request

for Accounting of Rents and Profits ("Request") asking Grazer for a
written and verified account of rents and profits with respect to the
Property during the redemption period. (R. 274-77).
16.

On July 16, 2008, counsel for Grazer filed an Objection and

Response to Request for Accounting of Rents and Profits ("Objection")
on the grounds that the Request was untimely, not properly served and an
attempt to improperly extend the redemption period. Objection and
Response to Request for Accounting of Rents and Profits. (R. 6278-82).
17.

The Objection further indicated that there had been no rents

or profits received from the Property since the date of the sheriffs sale.
(R. 6280).
18.

On August 15, 2008, one month after the expiration of the

redemption period, the Olsen Trust filed a Petition for Establishment of
Redemption Price. In connection with the Petition, the Olsen Trust
tendered to the Court a check in the amount of $2,465.00, which it
asserted, at that time, to be the correct redemption amount for the
Property. (R. 6302-06).
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19.

On May 5,2009, the trial court heard cross motions for

summary judgment and ruled that the Olsen Trust's redemption attempt
was valid and that the Olsen Trust "need only substantially comply with
the procedures of Rule 69C(c) for their [sic] redemption attempts to
succeed," See Ruling on Motions Pending at May 5, 2008 Hearing (the
"Ruling") p. 15. (R. 6941)
20.

On August 28, 2009, the trial court entered an order stating

On July 8, 2008, the Olsen Trust substantially complied with
the redemption procedures of Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure when it provided Defendant's counsel, who was
acting on behalf of his client, with (a) a copy of the Assignment; (b)
a check made payable to Plaintiffs counsel in the amount of $210;
and (c) a certificate of redemption.
{Proposed] Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on
Redemption ("Order") f 3. (R. 6972).
21 •

The Court ordered that Grazer be paid the sum of $210 after

the receipt of which Grazer "shall promptly execute and deliver to the
Olsen Trust a certificate of redemption in accordance with Rule 69C(g) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." {Id.).
22,

In that same ruling, Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions was denied.
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Order, f 1. (Id).
23,

Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal on September 18,

2009.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The issue on appeal is whether the July 8,2008 attempted
redemption by the Olsen Trust was valid as the Trial Court ruled. The
actions taken by the Olsen Trust subsequent to July 8,2008, however, are
illustrative of the fact that the Olsen Trust, in each of its attempts to
redeem the property, did not timely comply with all of the necessary
actions or provide all of the necessary documents required under Rule
69C. The July 8, 2008 redemption, accordingly, was invalid. The
attempted redemption of the Property was deficient in the following
particulars:
1.

The initial amount of $210.00 tendered by the Olson Trust on

July 8, 2008, was not the entire amount paid or expended by Grazer nor
did it include amounts for the "reasonable use and occupation55 of the
Property by Jones and was properly rejected by Grazer.
2.

The tender on July 8,2008 did not include a certified copy of
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the judgment or an affidavit of the amounts due under the judgment.
3.

The period for redemption expired on July 15, 2008. Despite

having previously been informed by letter dated July 8, 2008 by counsel
for Grazer that strict compliance with the redemption requirements would
be insisted upon, the Olson Trust failed to take further action towards
redemption of the Property prior to the expiration of the redemption
period. It filed its "Request for Accounting and Profits" on July 16, 2008,
one day after the expiration of the redemption period.
4,

The next action of the Olson Trust was not taken until

August 15, 2008, one month after the expiration of the redemption period
when it filed a "Petition for Establishment of Redemption Price." At that
time the Olson Trust finally tendered the sum of $2,465.00 to the Court,
the amount it calculated to be the amount required to redeem the Property
under Rule 69C. The action of filing the Petition and tendering an amount
to the Court should have been taken prior to the expiration of the
redemption period pursuant to Rule 69C(f) which governs a dispute over
the redemption price. "If there is a dispute about the redemption price, the
redemptioner shall within 20 days of the redemption pay into court the
amount necessary for redemption less the amount in dispute and file and
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serve upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the items to which the
redemptioner objects and the grounds for the objection." (Emphasis
added). Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 69C(f).

ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, if substantive rights are affected in a redemption
of property, strict compliance with the redemption requirements is
required. Huston v Lewis, 818P.2d531 (Utah 1991). Receiving the
correct redemption price or a title to property through the issuance of a
sheriffs deed are substantive rights. Id In Huston, Stateline Properties,
Inc. ("Stateline") had purchased property at a foreclosure sale.
Appellants, Lewis, notified Stateline to cease demolition on the property
shortly after Stateline's purchase of the property and notified Stateline 4
days prior to the expiration of the redemption period of their intent to
redeem the property. On the date on which the redemption period would
otherwise end, Lewis filed an ex parte motion to enlarge the period for
redemption which was granted and a date was set for hearing on the
amount to be paid for the redemption to be accomplished where the Court
established a date by which funds were to be deposited with the Court.
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Lewis was unable to the funds and the trial court ruled that the redemption
rights had irrevocably lapsed.
The Supreme Court affirmed stating, "[I]t is clear that the right of a
purchaser at a sheriffs sale either to receive the proper redemption
amount in accordance with rule 60(f) or to have the title perfected at the
end of the six-month period is a substantive right. Accordingly, strict
compliance with the six-month redemption period is normally required."
Id. at 535. The Court relied on a prior case, Mollerup v. Storage Systems
Internat% 569 P.2d 1122, 1124 (Utah 1977) in which the Court held
"redemption under rule 69(f)(3) requires strict compliance except where a
court sitting in equity decides that the circumstances warrant an extension
of the redemption period."
The Huston Court stated that Mollerup made it clear the
[M]ere allegation of a dispute is generally not sufficient to justify
an extension of the redemption period. 'To determine otherwise
would allow others similarly situated to simply appear ex parte,
assert a dispute... or some other self serving matter and the effect
would be to abridge the rights of a purchaser at sale "
Huston at 536.
3

The six month time period in Rule 69(f), Utah R. Civ. P., was changed
to 180 days in the present rule, Rule 69C(d), Ut. R. Civ. P.
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The Huston Court also rejected a setoff claim of an amount by
which waste had occurred on the subject property. The court stated, "By
waiting until the last moment to raise their claim, the Lewises insured that
if the court accepted their argument, Stateline would be prejudiced.
Under Lewises' theory, Stateline would have to accept the Lewises'
determination of the amount of the waste or the redemption period would
have to be enlarged in order for the court to make the determination." Id.
at 537. The Court further observed that former Rule 69(f)(3) allowed a
party to raise a dispute near the end of the redemption period "by paying
'the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the
court...' and filing 'with the court a petition setting forth the item or items
demanded to which he objects, together with the grounds for
objection...."' Id. See also, Springer v. Springer, 853 P.2d 888, (Utah
1993) (Redemption under rule 69(f)(3) requires strict compliance.4
Husband did not timely tender tax reimbursement, amount tendered did
not include interest, petition to object to amounts claimed was not filed
until two and one-half months after the redemption period expired).
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In this case, as in Huston and Springer, the Olsen Trust failed to
strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 69C which requires the
service on the purchaser of (1) a certified copy of the judgment which the
redemptioner claims the right to redeem {Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(c)(l)); (2)
an assignment of the redemption rights, if appropriate (Utah R. Civ. P.
69C(c)(2)); and (3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment
(Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(c)(3)). The Olsen Trust mailed a letter to the
counsel who had acted for the purchaser in the underlying case, not the
purchaser himself. Of the three documents required by the Rule, the letter
contained only the assignment. Even when the documents were returned
by counsel for the purchaser on the grounds that the purchaser needed to
be served and stating clearly that strict compliance would be required, the
subsequent service, by letter dated July 10,2008, again contained only the
assignment, not a certified copy of the judgment nor an affidavit showing
the amount due on the judgment. (See R. 6441). Providing only 1 out of 3
required documents is not "substantial" compliance. In ruling that the
provision of the Assignment was "substantial compliance" with Rule 69C,

4

Rule 69C(c)-(e) contain substantially the same provisions as former Rule
69(f)(2) and (3) which are cited and discussed infra.
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subparagraphs 69C(c)(l) and (c)(3) were rendered ineffective and of no
purpose. This is contrary to well established rules of statutory
construction in the State of Utah.
"It is a cardinal rule of construction that significance and effect
shall, if possible, be accorded to every section, clause, word or part
of the act." [Citation omitted].
The several provisions of the statute should be construed together
in the light of the general purpose and object of the act and so as to
give effect to the main intent and purpose of the legislature as
therein expressed. [Citation omitted].
An interpretation which defeats any of the manifest purposes of the
statute cannot be accepted. [Citation omitted].
Dunn v. Bryan, 11 Utah 604; 299 P. 253 (1931); Cf. South Ridge
Homeowners9Association v. Brown, 2010 UT App. 23 (February 4,
2010)(When interpreting the plain language [of a document] the court
looks for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering
any provision meaningless. A court is to consider each provision in
relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and
ignoring none).
Further, even if the lack of two out of three of the documents
required under Rule 69C(c) could be deemed to be "substantial
compliance," the July 10, 2008 letter tendered only $210.00, the amount
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of the purchase price plus 6% interest since the date of the sheriffs sale.
It did not contain the amounts claimed by Grazer under Grazer's July 9,
2009 Notice for additional amounts. The Olsen Trust admits it became
aware that additional amounts were demanded on July 15, 2008; however,
no effort was made to pay those amounts into court as required under the
rule. "If there is a dispute about the redemption price, the redemptioner
shall within 20 days of the redemption pay into court the amount
necessary for redemption less the amount in dispute and file and serve
upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the items to which the
redemptioner objects and the grounds for the objection. (Emphasis
added.)" Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 69C(f).
Instead, the Olsen Trust's Petition to Establish Redemption Price
was not filed until August 19, 2008, forty-two (42) days after the first
rejected redemption attempt, thirty-five (35) days after the Olsen Trust
admits it became aware of the amounts claimed to be due under Grazer's
Notice and thirty-five (35) days after the expiration of the 180 day
redemption period. It was not until August 19, 2008 that the Olsen Trust
paid into the Court "the amount necessary for redemption less the amount
in dispute." At that time, in pleadings filed with the Court, the Olsen
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Trust acknowledged that the $210.00 had been inadequate.
Since 1991, Utah case law has emphasized that substantive rights of
a purchaser in the redemption process require strict compliance with the
rules and that a sheriffs sale should be set aside only in exceptional
circumstances. See, Huston, Springer, supra. This standard was
approved in a recent State of Utah Court of Appeals case, Pyper v. Bond,
2009 UT App 331; 643 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, certgranted,225 P.3d 880
(Utah 2010). In Pyper, however, the court found that exceptional
circumstances existed in that case.5 The sheriffs sale was set aside based
upon the failure of plaintiff s former counsel to return telephone calls
regarding the amount necessary to redeem property and the inadequacy of
the price bid at the sheriffs sale. Although the time to redeem the
property at issue was extended, given the exceptional facts of the
particular case, the Court also noted:
Despite our conclusion, we are not unsympathetic to Respondents5
5

The Pyper Court also relied on the cases of Young v. Schroeder, 37, P.
252 (Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, 1894) and Pender v. Dowse,
265 P.2d 644 (Utah 1954). However both of the cases involved
circumstances the purchaser impeded the redemption process in ways the
Court determined to be unfair. In Young, there were serious irregularities
in the sale for which the parties who claimed title were responsible. In
Pender, the debtor was deliberately misled by the purchaser.
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argument that Utah law provides many other safeguards to protect
judgment debtors and that because of such safeguards, courts
should be reluctant to extend redemption periods. In particular,
rule 69C(f) prevents creditors from obstructing the redemption
process by refusing to participate therein. See Utah R. Civ. P.
69C(f) (addressing disputes over redemption price); Granada, Inc.
v. Tanner, 712 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah 1985) ("The intent of [former]
Rule 69(f)(3) is to allow a redemptioner to pay the funds into court
so that the holder of the certificate of sale cannot clog the equity of
redemption by refusing to cooperate in the redemption process.").
In light of rule 69C(f), we decline to recognize any duty on the part
of a sheriffs sale purchaser to affirmatively cooperate with an
attempted redemption. Here, however, [Appellant's] words and
actions represented, at least implicitly, that they were going to
participate in the redemption process. It is their failure to act in
accordance with this representation that justifies the district court's
finding of unfairness warranting relief.
(Emphasis added). Id. at 15.
The Pyper case also brought a vigorous dissent which concluded
that the case set an unwise precedent. The dissent observed that the two
cases relied on by the majority
[I]nvolve some kind of affirmative actions or representations
directly aimed at impeding redemption. "[A] purchaser at a
sheriffs sale is under no obligation to communicate with the
judgment debtor at all—a point that the majority apparently
concedes, (citation omitted).
Id. at 18.
The dissent, further, marked conduct similar to the actions or lack
of action taken by the Olsen Trust in this case:
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Pyper was both aware that there was some deadline for redeeming
the property and was, apparently, represented by different legal
counsel Pyper could have easily obtained the necessary
redemption information from the district court and could have paid
the court in order to exercise his right of redemption, all without
any assistance from Bond and Dorius. Indeed, he eventually,
although belatedly, did just that.
(Emphasis added,). Id. at 20. It is also important to note that the Utah
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Pyper.
Similarly, here, the Olsen Trust could have paid the undisputed
amount into Court as provided under the Rule prior to the expiration of
the redemption period. There were no representations by Grazer or
Grazer's counsel as to lead the Olsen Trust that anything less than strict
compliance with the redemption procedures would be accepted. In fact,
counsel for Grazer specifically informed counsel for the Olsen Trust, prior
to the expiration of the 180 day period, that he "intended to insist upon
strict compliance...." See Exhibit "C" to Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Strike Petition for Establishment of Redemption Price dated
October 12, 2008. (R. 6429). The Olsen Trust chose not to follow the
procedures set forth in the Rule 69C and did not pay the disputed amounts
necessary to redeem into Court as required when it was apparent that there
would be a dispute. Only belatedly was compliance with the provisions
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of the Rule attempted.
Finally, both the trial court and the Olsen Trust relied on the cases
of United States v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976) and Tech-Fluid
Svs., Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
for the proposition that substantial compliance will satisfy the
requirements of the redemption procedure outlined in Rule 69C. That
reliance is misplaced. The Rule governing redemption requirements in
effect at the time Loosley was decided was Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 69(f).
Subparagraphs (f)(2) and (3) of Rule 69(f) provided:
(2) Redemption -How Made. At the time of redemption the
person seeking the same may make payment of the amount required
to the person from whom the property is being redeemed, or for
him to the officer who made the sale or his successor in office. At
the same time the redemptioner must produce to the officer or
person from whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his notice to
the officer: (1) a certified copy of the docket of the judgment under
which he claims the right to redeem, or, if he redeems upon a
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record thereof
certified by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly acknowledged
or proved where the same is necessary to establish his claim; (3)
an affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount then
actually due on the lien.
(3) Time for Redemption, Amount to be Paid. The property may
be redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on
paying the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in
addition, together with the amount of any assessment or taxes and
any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance,
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upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the property which the
purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase, with interest
on such amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a
lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, other than the
judgment under which said purchase was made, the amount of such
lien, with interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum
demanded for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person
seeking redemption may pay the amount necessary for redemption,
less the amount in dispute, to the court out of which execution or
order authorizing the sale was issued, and at the same time file with
the court a petition setting forth the item or items demanded to
which he objects, together with his grounds of objection; and
thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for hearing of
such objections. A copy of the petition and order fixing time for
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than two days
before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the
court shall enter an order determining the amount required for
redemption. In the event an additional amount to that theretofore
paid to the clerk is required the person seeking redemption shall
forthwith execute and deliver a proper certificate or redemption
upon being paid the amount required by the court for redemption.
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 69(f)(2) and (3) (1975). See also, SUMMARY OF
UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW, VOLUME I, §9.236 (J. Reuben Clark
LawSch., 1978.)
The Loosely Court indicated that the redemptioner had substantially
complied with Rule 69(f)(2) and did not deal with the requirements of rule
69(f)(3). Further, in requiring the purchasers at the sheriffs sale to
release the mortgage upon receipt of the tendered payment for
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redemption, the Court relied on the facts that the correct redemption
amount had been tendered prior to the expiration of the redemption
period:
They [the purchasers] did not then, and do not now, question that
the debtor redemptioner's rights had, in fact, been assigned to the
defendant; nor that the defendant made the tender of the correct
amount due for redemption one day before the redemption period
expired. When so advised they did not then indicate any ground
whatsoever for rejecting the tender. If they had done so, defendants
would have had 24 hours to remedy any technical deficiency.
Loos ley at 508.
The case of Tech-Fluid Svcs. was also decided under former
Rule 69(f), with language similar to that in effect at the time of Loosely.
The Tech-Fluid decision, however, made a distinction between
substantive rights under subparagraph f(3) of Rule 69 which required
strict compliance and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule 69 under which
"substantial compliance is the proper test." Id at 1334. As in Loosely,
the Court found that the redemptioner had "tendered the correct amount
within the redemption period" and further found that "Tech-Fluid did not
challenge the validity of the tender until several days after the tender and
after the redemption period had run." (Emphasis added). Id.
In this case, unlike in Loosely or Tech-Fluid, from outset,
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commending with the time of the initial tender, counsel for Grazer
indicated that strict compliance would be required, that the redemption
price had not been appropriately served, that the redemption amount was
not correct. Grounds were given for rejection of the tender - the amount
tendered was not the correct redemption amount Grazer had the
substantive right to receive. Failing to receive the correct redemption
amounts due,

* Grazer's substantive right to receive title to the

Property by sheriffs deed was not just affected; it was thwarted.
CONCLUSION
Grazer had a substantive right to either timely receive the property
redemption amount in accordance with the procedure set forth in Rule
69C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to have the his title perfected
through the issuance of a sheriffs deed at the end of the redemption
period when that period expired on July 15, 2008. The Olsen Trust did
not tender the correct redemption amount, the correct documentation to
the correct party when it made its first attempted redemption on July 8,
2008. Despite its "awareness" on July 9, 2008 that Grazer claimed
additional amounts under the Notice properly recorded with the Davis
County Recorder, the Olsen Trust still failed to tender the amounts or the
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documents required under the Rule. Compliance with the provisions of
the Rule was not made until 35 days after the expiration of the redemption
period, 45 days after the initial attempted redemption. The redemption
was not timely, the redemption attempts were invalid and strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 69C was not met. The trial
court erred in granting the Olsen Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment,
in ruling that the Olsen Trust need only "substantially comply" with the
requirements of Rule 69C and ordering Grazer to execute a Certificate of
Redemption upon the payment of $210.00. Grazer's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions
should have been granted. Grazer asks this Court to reverse the Order of
the trial court and remand the case to the trial court with directions to
enter partial summary judgment in favor of Grazer with regard to the
redemption and to require a sheriffs deed to issue vesting title to the
Property in Grazer in accordance with his substantive rights.

[Date and signature on next page]
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IN II IK SK< ONI) DISTRICT COURT, 1 )A VIS COUNTY
STATROFIITAII
GORDON JONES an individual; and
RICHARD BARNEY, an individual,
Plaintiffs,

RULING ON MOTIONS PENDING AT
MAY 5,2009 HEARING

vs.

ALLEN F. GRAZER, an individual,
Defendant.

Case No. 020700570
°n

A

^phh

ALLEN F. GRAZER,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
vs.

GORDON A. JONES; and RICHARD
BARNEY,
Counterclaim Defendants.
VD29O47707

GORDANJONES, an:i.!. :
RICHARD BARNEY an individual;
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

R W DESIGN, INC., a Utah corporation,
ROBERTS W. SPEIRS PLUMBING, INC
Utah corporation; SCOTT SESSIONS, L..
individual; and NU-TREND ELECTRIC
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendants.
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ALLEN F. GRAZER,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GORDON A. JONES and LINDA G. JONES,
husband and wife and as Trustees, Gordon
and Linda Jones Family Trust; CHERYL
GUDMUNDSON, an individual; G. SCOTT
JONES, an individual; JASON JONES, an
individual; GS JONES CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation; J & J
LIVESTOCK, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company; RICHARD H. BARNEY and
RENAE CARNON BARNEY, husband and
wife; RENAE CARNON BARNEY, Trustee
of the Renae Carnon Barney Trust; RENAE
CARNON BARNEY FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP; ROCHELLE C. BARNEY;
RICHILYN WOODIN; THE LINDA G.
JONES FAMILY PARTNERSHIP; and
JOHN DOES 1-20,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on: (1) Allen Grazer's Motion for Equitable Lien and
Order of Foreclosure (Idaho Tractor); (2) Defendant Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions; (3) The Olsen Trust's Cross Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment; (4) Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against GS
Jones Construction, Inc.; and (5) Counterclaim Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Garnishee
Judgment Against the Shaffer Law Office or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment Setting
Aside Fraudulent Transfers. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along
2

with supporting documentation The Court also conducted a hearing on u 2009 iljufij" 1.1 MI :-

,

• Arguments, being fully advised in the premises, aim •: .LW

reasons set forth below, the Court rules as follow:

BACKGROUND
Xhis matter arose be" ~

Plaintiffs ,

(Herein, "Barney")1 and Deten*•

. ,nes") and R ichard Barney

n Grazer (herein ^(^/^"x regarding the consti uction of

a resident

...K- Ja3ne>

f-achpam

aims against

the other and a bench trial was held ti«^. *pnl 26, L W J UJM»I-C.
.'iM^, (In I 'i > "i»« ii il1 its I Hidings ol hid and Conclusions of Law pursuant to the bench jial.
The Court ruled in favor of Grazer on each of the plaint* *.

,

.;....,.* ,i azer's

counterclaim. I he Court subsequently entered judgment m favor of Grazer on Fnh
the amount of $1,886,727,87 S»n< <" (<""" »"""" , I ' i v |'

•

lf

* -

, me partis ,.flvc filed numcu-us

motions with the Court' in a coiiliiiiiiiiir dispute regarding Grazer's collection of hi*award.
On October 5, 2005, and prior lo ihe certification of the judgment L.L liiial t HAJ IT M i •. fil
a mi

if n, ii II i^l

MI

in lunch lotMScl, ihe Shaffer Law Office, request!;

any property,, including money, held by the Shaffer I ,a
Shaffei I ,dv\ i Hint", through Dar-u • • Shafier, respont
such property. However, Jones had — •

<'

*

,V>°,000 as a retainer to pay for its legal re;tn %

-

identification of
-: MI interest in T lie

ie v rit asserting that it held no
ice approximately

-i

*ouc< n> th.s and related

B y written ruling datfd V1""'' I I, JOlKi, Hn t W i i certified the judgment as final.
Subsequently, Jones filed a bankruptcy action in the "United States Bankrupt*11 y I, YHII f U >i the

Subsequent to the filing of this action ILmk i tLnJ Hiim1'! s L&tutc is now party to this litigation.

3

District of Utah; Case No. 06-21277 JAB. On January 31, 2007, the Trustee of Jones'
bankruptcy estate entered a settlement agreement with Grazer. Pursuant to this settlement
agreement, the parties agreed to resolve and compromise any and all claims and disputes, which
then existed between them. However, the settlement agreement specifically exempted Jones'
property that was subject to Grazer's pending fraudulent transfer actions in Utah and Idaho.
One of the fraudulent transfers that Grazer alleged pertains to $80,000 paid to GS Jones
Construction, Inc. for work performed on a residential home owned by Mr. and Mrs. Harry
Sayama (herein, the "Sayamas"). On March 1,2005, Jones' company, Gordon Jones
Construction, submitted a bid proposal to the Sayamas for renovations on their home. However,
the Sayamas issued a check for $80,000 to GS Jones Construction, Inc., a company formed by
Jones and his son on June 2, 2005. Grazer alleges that this check was issued to GS Jones
Construction, Inc., rather than Gordon Jones Construction in an attempt tofraudulentlyavoid
Grazer's garnishing the payment. Jones counters this argument by asserting that GS Jones
Construction, Inc. took over the Sayama project in July 2005 and performed the vast majority of
work on the Sayama home, which entitles it to the $80,000 payment.
Anotherfraudulenttransfer that Grazer alleged of Jones pertains to a loan that Jones
made to his son for the purchase of a tractor. On March 4, 2005, four (4) months prior to the
Court entering judgment against Jones in this matter, Jones loaned his son $51,000 to purchase a
tractor. Grazer alleges that Jones' son never repaid this loan and that it was merely one of a
series of fraudulent transfers of property by Jones to avoid Grazer's collection on his judgment
Jones rebuts Grazer's allegations indicating that the loan was not a fraudulent transfer and
asserting that Grazer has presented no evidence to support his claim to the contrary.
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Additionally, on Tai^n \

" J'Oi'* n TSUJIV, :.*.»

- * of execution dated Novrmbri H

-v-nco aiiu ilk barney's Estate's interest in certain real
•sropert> ift..r

. ^ County, Utah (herein, the "Prop, ilv I l>i llu hirhr.l lu.ltlu .\l Ihe

Mlieiilfs sale, ilif bight: st hnUi»r was Grazer vith.it* ?•• ^ I S> ? 0* On July 7, 2008 Jonc-idad
the Barney's Estate executed >••

<

<

gm:, iiie^;.

><

-\:>Mgnmr:t"y

pi uporting to assign their right to redeem the Property Jo « ndvig!) Olsen and Jack - *4
asni'stivs'ii'Mn i i|<i\ i(» 11 i iiscii ,111-1 lacKie ivl UIM M I" ist (herein, the "Olsen Trust").
On July 8, 2008, and within thr i *.
• In I lldli Kuli>

i

- >H

i•.'!I Proccduic, the Olsen

has tn -

a redeem the Propeit M*

delivering to Grazer's counsel: (1) a copy of the Assi^iimcti I. ' i • tuvk made payable lo
Grazer" s counsel in the amount ol Si 10.00, purporting to cover Ihe $191 00 purchase price1 plus
six percent (6%) annual interest <« i until" linn

he njn

m ir sn :n<i •• ,,::!ti

i

Jid i.h a prop •

certificate ol red*, nipt I on The Olsen Trust requested that Grazer sign and a^iui

J

e

proposed certificate ol rvdrninliun inid h lum llie same to the Olsen Trust no later man Jul}
2008.
Si lbsequently , on July 8, 2008, Urazer's counsel returned the documents and check to the
Olsen Trust thereby rejecting thru fender, By It Iter of same *Lilc Gi F H < i nuiisrl inf

i

I ihr

Olsen I rust that Ms reason for rejecting the tender was -;ai -e was not authwn/ed to accept
service of the redemption materials on tx
^

r a ther

*.

;icck was made payable

than Grazer.

On July 9, 2008, pui'^m

l^ii'lc (VK/(cj

„, «u.* -. % *vil Procedure. Graze?

had recorded a Notice of Amounts Paid and Owed with die liavib «
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which Grazer claimed that he had incurred and paid $2,178.02 in conjunction with the sheriffs
sale along with an additional $2,750.00 in costs.
On July 10, 2008, the Olsen Trust attempted to redeem the Property for a second time.
The Olsen Trust, after being informed that Grazer's counsel now had the authority to accept
service of the redemption materials, delivered: (1) a copy of the Assignment; (2) a check made
payable to Grazer in the amount of $210.00; and (3) a proposed certificate of redemption.
By letter dated July 14, 2008, the day before the end of the 180-day redemption period,
Grazer indicated to the Olsen Trust that he would not execute the proposed certificate of
redemption thus rejecting the Olsen Trust's second attempted redemption. In this letter, Grazer
asserted his belief that the Olsen Trust's Assignment was not a bona fide transfer for value and
was thus afraudulenttransfer, that the attempted redemption failed to pay the amounts Grazer
claimed owed in his Notice of Amounts Paid and Owed recorded July 9, 2008, and his belief that
Jones and/or individuals under Jones' control and/or direction had used the Property since the
sheriffs sale. The Olsen Trust's documents and check were subsequently returned.
Following the rejection of the Olsen Trust's second attempted redemption, on August 15,
2008, the Olsen Trust filed a Petition for Establishment of Redemption Price on the Property and
submitted to the Court a check in the amount of $2,465.00, purporting to encompass the entire
undisputed and correct amount of the redemption price for the Property. By written ruling dated
December 12, 2008, the Court found the Olsen Trust had failed to strictly comply with Rule
69C(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to the 20-day deadline for filing a petition
to determine a disputed redemption price. However, the Court did not reach the merits of the
Olsen Trust's attempted redemptions of July 8, 2008 and July 10,2008, but noted that the parties
werefreeto raise the issue at a later date.
6

" ^sequently, the paiiies completed r^f*ne hi me instant motion
.iic v ourt iielu a hearing on the instant motions A \ iti
1

5

i^OL\ the parties reasserted the argument

.*. • .u&aruing e.K .,,.;,-

ni'J.iiil motions. \\ iiit close of the hearing, tfie parties submitted the motions for decision and
the Court took the matter

'

»i-w^i^ .:ie nstant motions are ripe for

determination
i H VSIS
L

Allen Grazer's Motion for Equitable Lien and Order of Fori, -I i .n , • n ( I d • li
Tractor).
On December 20, 2007, < ii'.mi hied lii'i iimfioii Ioi rqmlable hen and order of

foreclosure (Idaho Tractor). In his accompanying supporting memorandum,

* * .

this transaction was not a loan, but rather was a fraudulent transfer made in dn attempt to .collectic

* : hater's judgment. In support of his •*-—,^'

k •

.-

niths pi ioi to the entry of ju

j

^. .

t

Se

s \\VA Jones, the fad tfiat luav„

son has not repard tn*» loan, and the fact that Jones

..

.,,^ vO\aiii assets

after entry of the judgment.
Jones filed his mcinoraiidiiHi it. oppo^'iM! In (h;\/cr s mo'ion on January 14,2008. In his
opposing memorandum, Jones asserted that Grazer had not nn^ented a sufficient factual hi*-" • <»
succeed on his motion Spec <

ugued that the mcic fact that the loan was made m

the same year as the judgment does not mdirate the loan was frauo
submit i< d ihui :it iii !•

IIIIK:

oi liit, loan he had over $1,000,000 in assets and no need to

fraudulently transfer his assets. Jones also ar.r

^

11 aclur .iiici his son, as both reside in Idaho a

on over the

-oan occurr», .ii .a^iiu. Jones then assert' d

that an equitable lien ana ii i si 1 IN li i-I • \\ mill A% i • s I A •• iimdiie process
/

On February 13, 2008, Grazer filed his reply memorandum in support of his motion. In
his reply, Grazer argued that the court clearly had jurisdiction over money transferred by Jones, a
resident of Utah, to his son. Grazer also noted that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Jones'
son, as he made an appearance in this action when hefiledan answer on February 6, 2006.
Grazer then asserted that the fact Jones' son never repaid the loan is evidence of its fraudulent
nature. Further, Grazer enumerated other instances of Jones' attempts to conceal his property
from Grazer, such as Jones' attempt to hide is car at his neighbor's residence. Grazer then
submitted that an equitable lien is appropriate under the circumstances.
Subsequently, at the May 5, 2009 hearing, the parties submitted this matter for decision.
First, as a preliminary matter on the issue of whether the Court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over Jones' son, the Court's file contains an answerfiledby Jones' son on February
6,2006. Accordingly, the Courtfindsthat Jones' son has made a general appearance in this
litigation and has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court. See Barlow v.
Cappo, 821 P.2d 465,466-67 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[A]n appearance by the defendant for any
purpose except to object to personal jurisdiction constitutes a general appearance. In fact, by
asking the court for any affirmative relief, a defendant thereby submits himself or herself to that
court's jurisdiction."). Thus, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on Grazer's motion for equitable
lien and the Court rejects Jones' due process argument regarding the same.
Next, an equitable lien is a remedy available to courts to avoid injustice to, or unjust
enrichment of, a party. See Harline v. Danes, 567 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). "Where property of
one person can by a proceeding in equity be reached by another as security for a claim on the
ground that otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched, an equitable lien arises." Id. at
1121, fii. 1 {quoting Restatement of Restitution, §161). However, u[t]he mere fact that a person
8

benefits anothei "s not of itself sufficient to require the other to make restu •
I

.

. stitution § 1, Comment c). Accordingly, in. determining whether

.1 suitable lie1:- s <mpiopnate, the Court must weigh the I'liriimsLmres n.C (In; IUISI ,iiid da ink
„\ Imlhcr such <i hen is necessar- tr avoid injustice 01 nm>f enrvf
xii me instant matt -i

.

.\

\

.:;u and supporting

documentation for the Court to grant his motion for an equitable lien against the Id*:1
Vi iiotnl by Ui\\ "., Hi', nine hi. I Hi,!1! ,i pi J ciiiiiil was entered against Jones in the same year as
)

the loan to his son does not substantiate a fraudulent transfer "*
Jones jllcoipls M» conceal property that Grazer's motion relies * p*

*nn *me factor m ih^

Court's analysis, and regardless are distinguishable;1 fioin ill , Id

. .,.. v occurred

after the Court entered judgment against Jones, The loan at issue here occurred four • 4) months
prior to the judgment The (Jul Ili.ii hmc\ m.n LHT ilii'injiud lo liulc his assets after the entry of
judgment against him does not necessarily mean that Jones' loan made prior to the judgment 'was
fraudulent.
Additionally, while Grazer asserts that Jones' son has not repaid tl
present competent evidence to support such an assertion. The only evidence that Grazer has
presented is that the loan was undocumented and ihiil HI HIS ih'poMhmi, I'oiics sl.Ued thai lie
considered the transaction a "father-to-son loan,,J that would W JMH' back "'whenever [his son]

2

The finding of a fraudulent transfer is a highly fact sensitive issue that requires the Court to weigh several factors,
which are enumerated in Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5(2). See Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 163 P.3d 713, 722
(Utah Ct. App. 2007) ("Importantly the existence offraudulentintent is a factual question, which necessarily
involves weighing the evidence presented and assessing the credibility of witnesses - tasks largely within the
province of the fact-finder."); see also Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5(2).
4
Depo. Gordon A. Jones, 1.57:13-16, 23, 158:5-7, 10-12 (June 8, 2006)

9

can get it paid off." Finally, Grazer's conclusory allegations that the money loaned to Jones' son
is subject to his garnishment are insufficient to establish the same.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Grazer has failed to present sufficient evidence as to the
nature and circumstances of the loan to move the equities of the Court to grant an equitable lien
against the Idaho tractor. The Court must therefore DENY Grazer's motion for equitable lien and
order of foreclosure (Idaho Tractor).
II.

Defendant Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity of
Attempted Redemptions.
On January 9, 2009, Grazerfiledhis motion for partial summary judgment regarding

invalidity of attempted redemptions. In his accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer
argued that the Olsen Trust's July 8, 2008 and July 10,2008 attempted redemptions must fail.
First, Grazer asserted that the July 8, 2008 attempted redemption fails because the materials and
payment check were submitted and made payable to his counsel, rather than himself. Grazer
contends that his counsel did not have authority to accept the Olsen Trust's attempted
redemption on his behalf until July 9, 2008. Next, Grazer argued that the Olsen Trust's July 10,
2008 attempted redemption fails because the $210.00 payment check was in the wrong amount.
Grazer noted that, pursuant to Rule 69C(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,5 a notice of
additional costs was recorded with the Davis County Recorder's Office on July 9,2008, which
increased the amount necessary to redeem the Propertyfrom$210.00 to at least $2,465.00. Thus,
Grazer averred the Olsen Trust failed to properly and timely redeem the Property within the 180-

4

Depo. Gordon A. Jones, 149:10-13 (June 8,2006).
Rule 69C(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads in relevant part, "If the purchaser or redemptioner files
with the county recorder notice of the amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance, maintenance, repair or any
lien other than the lien on which the redemption was based, the price to redeem includes such amounts plus six
percent for an initial redemption or three percent for a subsequent redemption. Failure to file notice of the amounts
with the country recorder waives the right to claim such amounts." Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(e).
5
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day redemption period as set forth in Rule 69C(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and thus,
c:

the I 'li'ijif iiitis! Inn! Ih.il <\w In "M"l ilu I Jlsen I rust's attempted redemptions failed.

]|

On February 5, 2009, Barney's Estate filed a memorandum in opposition 1" i < Ira/ci "s

Si
•;

i

In its opposing memorandum, Barney's Estate argued that a material issue of fact exists

**

regarding whether Grazer will receive a windfall if fin* in' \ .s, <
' M"S and Jul v 111, 2008 attempted

t;

redemptions are defeated. Barney's Estate asserts that because the Court's December 12,2008

?!

vi

ruling did not n\n h ihr inn il «. i il Ihis argument, a material issue of fact must exist regarding
Grazer's motion and therefore, the motion must be denied.6
led its memorandum in opposition to Grazer's
motion. In its opposing memorandum, the Olsen Irusl argttni dial its attrmplnl lakmptions at
least substantially complied with Rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure and that as a
result, Grazer should not be allowed to «i« §>i»\« if i il in mi. s' .^signed i cdemption rights. Further,
the Olsen Trust averred that Grazer's counsel had the authority to accept the July 8, 2008 tender
of payment based 'ipon Ins \nvu M" iMuiynit mil .ihilily to accept documents filed in this action.
The Olsen Trust asserted that because Grazer's counsel had authority to accept <1<H uimnf«

n

• ni.tliu'i and (ira/n Ii.nl nm n't itcorded the notice of additional costs with the Davis County
Recorder's Office, the redemption check for $210.00 payable to Grazer's rotiose! sul'tii-Mill \
oHiiplinJ .villi Hit," redemption requirements of Rule 69C.

6

On April 24,2009, Grazer filed a motion to strike the memorandum in opposition filed by Barney's Estate. In the
accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer argued that the Estate lacks standing to object to Grazer's challenge
to the attempted redemptions, as it does not seek an interest in the Property. Further, Grazer asserts that the opposing
memorandum failed to set forth any disputed or undisputed facts, as required by Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and should be disregarded in its entirety. No responsive pleading was filed with the Court; however, as
the Olsen Trust's opposing memorandum raises the same argument as the Estate's opposition and the Court does not
rely upon the Estate's opposition in reaching its determination, the Courtfindsthat Grazer's motion to strike is futile
and DENIES the same.
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Additionally, the Olsen Trust argued that Grazer's counsel's failure to provide notice of
the July 9, 2008 recording of additional costs relating to the redemption should estop Grazer
from claiming that the $210.00 payment check submitted in its July 10, 2008 redemption attempt
was insufficient. The Olsen Trust submitted that Grazer's and his counsel's actions were made in
bad faith and that the Court should not allow Grazer to receive an unwarranted windfall if the
attempted redemptions fail, as the Olsen Trust noted that Grazer purchased the Property at the
sheriffs sale for $191.00 and the Property is worth over $500,000.
On April 9,2009, Grazer filed his reply memorandum in support of his motion. In his
reply, Grazer asserted that the Court has already ruled that strict compliance with Rule 69C of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is required. Thus, Grazer submits that the Olsen Trust's
attempted redemptions have no legal force or effect, as the July 8,2008 attempt was tendered to
the wrong party and the July 10,2008 attempt did not include the full redemption amount.
Further, Grazer noted that neither attempted redemption included a certified copy of the
judgment/lien, or an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment/lien, as required by Rule
69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Grazer asserted that the Olsen Trust has
submitted no evidence supporting the allegations of impropriety directed at himself and his
counsel. Accordingly, Grazer requested the Court find that each of the Olsen Trust's attempted
redemptions failed to strictly comply with Rule 69C and order the sheriff to deliver to him a deed
to the Property.
Subsequently, at the May 5,2009 hearing, the parties submitted this matter for decision.
As a preliminary consideration, the parties do not dispute the material facts and
circumstances of the Olsen Trust's attempted redemptions. The issues before the Court are issues
of law regarding the interpretation of Rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
12

applying the undisputed facts to such interpretation. AccunlmH\ 'hMVul inav gianl summary
ci

judgment on Grazer's motion if appropriate.

}j

T h e p r i m a r y issue in G r a z e r ' s mniiMii tor paitial s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t r e g a r d i n g invalidity

\\

of attempted redemptions is whether Rule 69C requires strict or substantial compliance 1 ( si net
<r
*'

c<>inpii,iiii:</ iv "'ni'ii'sd, thin *W i ''Isen Trust's attempted redemptions must fail as neither

!i

#
r!

complied with the requirements of serving a certified copy ot the iiidginenMieii .unl .in ,i( ti<lu\ il

M

1 ii

11 it« the amount due on the judgment/lien. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(c). However, if

substantial compliance is all that is required under Rule >
' *>< |r )„ linn lln: i Mv/ii I rust has at least
substantially complied with the Rule with its July 8, 2008 attempted redemption.
While Grazer assert that the ( oun \ * 'svaiitxi I>, !008 ruling already decided the issue
of whether strict or substantial compliance with Rule 69C is required, the Court's mlmr n as
IHHIIMI HI

1\ in ili iriiiiiicfiicimh ml Rule 69C(f) pertaining to the filing of a petition to establish a

disputed redemption price. The Court's ruling did not address the ^

or

silbstantial compliance is required under the procedures set forth in Rule 69C(c), which is at
issue in Grazer's instant motion.8
The Olsen Trust places its reliance that substantial compliance is required under Rule
69C(c) on the Utah Supreme < \ turf ,:*isc ('mWt/ States i Loosley. bb I F.2d 506 (Utah 1976). In
Loosley, the Court was asked to determine if a party's failure to deliver the appropriate
redemption document «-f^ hlA n ip- mIemjits at redeeming certain real property. The Loosley
Court discussed the purpose of a foreclosure proceeding being equitable iii ii.ilin In \\\\
7

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
8
Rule 69C(c) provides that a redemptioner shall pay the amount required to the purchaser and shall serve on the
purchaser: (1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the right to redeem exists; (2) an assignment, if
necessary to establish the claim; and (3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 69C(c).
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"[Rjules and statutes dealing with redemption are regarded as remedial in
character and should be given liberal construction and application to
permit a property owner who can pay his debts to do so, and thus make his
creditor whole, and save his property."
Id. at 508. Then, applying this liberal construction, the Court held, "if a debtor, acting in good
faith, has substantially complied with the procedural requirements of the rule ... the law will not
aid in depriving the mortgagor of his property for mere falling short of exact compliance with
technicalities." Id. (Emphasis added).
The Loosley holding was further discussed in the Utah Court of Appeals' analysis in
Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc. 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In
Tech-Fluid Services, Inc., the Court discussed when strict and substantial compliance standards
should be used in the context of redemption rights, to wit:
"Not all redemption provisions are alike. Courts, in evaluating the
necessity for strict compliance in these kinds of cases, focus upon the
nature of the statutory requirements and the likelihood of prejudice. If
failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a substantive right of one
of the parties and possibly prejudice that party, then courts require strict
compliance. On the other hand, if the requirements are merely procedural
and will not prejudice one of the parties, substantial compliance is
sufficient."
Id. at 1333 (Emphasis added). The Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. Court then found that the time limit
for redemption "clearly affects a substantive right of the purchaser" as "[a]ll right, title and
interest in the property do no vest in the purchaser at a foreclosure sale until the redemption
period has expired." Id. However, the Court based its holding on the procedural requirements of
redemption, just as in Loosley, noting that substantial compliance was all that is required under
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the redemption provision that discusses how redemption is made, i e the nirrenl Rule (){H '"It ),"'"'
which is precisely the subsection of the Rule at issue in the instant matter.
Accordingly, based upon ! 1 IN liuldmf^ ami iiimlvsib ul L>)osUiy and l\rh Fluid

Services,

Inc., the Court finds that the Olsen Trust need only substantially comply with the procedures o f
Uuli fi'H'^t1) 1'ir Ihnr rnlnnpliim alirn1111s to succeed.
In the July 8, 2008 redemption attempt the Olsen Trust provided G r a z e r \ counsel <v»'h
i l i i copy ot die Assignment; (2) a check made payable to Grazer's counsel in the amount o f
$210.00, purporting to cover the $191.00 purchase piii v pl.is si> parent (C>V) animal interest
accruing from the date o f the sheriffs sale; and (3) a certificate o f redemption. While the Olsen
Trust failed to provide Graver \\ iih ;i rcmfiod i.opv of f he judgment/lien and an affidavit
regarding the amount due, the Court finds that the Olsen Trust nevertheless substantially
r o m p h n l vvilfi t)i„ pitk tuliiinl iu|ii«ieincnts oi Rule69C(c). In so ruling, the Court finds that •
Grazer's argument that his counsel did not have authority to accept the redemption attempl i'i
J ul y H H it IK, is iinpersuasive and without merit. A s argued by the Olsen Trust, Grazer's counsel
was involved from the beginning of this litigation ,nu1 li.til ll r authority to accept documents
filed therein throughout the proceedings. Further, the Olsen Trust's windfall argument adds
support to the Court's finding. While the parties presented nc • ev idence regarding the appraised
value of the Property, its value is clearly greater than the $191.00 paid at the sheriffs sale by
Grazer. Accordingly, Hi*: < 'ourt nui^f ' >hN Y < ira/ei "s motion lor partial summary judgment
regarding invalidity o f attempted redemptions.

9

See Tech-Fluid Services, Inc., 787 P.2d at 1334 ("Based upon the authority discussed above, and in particular
Loosley, we affirm that substantial compliance is the proper test under Rule 69(f)(2).")-
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III.

The Olsen Trust's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The Olsen Trust's cross motion for partial summary judgment pertains to the same

subject matter as Grazer's motion for partial summary judgment regarding invalidity of
attempted redemptions and contains the same arguments, i.e. the Olsen Trust's July 8, 2008 and
July 10, 2008 attempted redemptions.10 Accordingly, the Court's determination on Grazer's
motion dictates the Court's ruling on the Olsen Trust's cross motion. Therefore, because the
Court denies Grazer's motion due to the Olsen Trust's July 8, 2008 attempted redemption
substantially complying with Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must
GRANT the Olsen Trust's cross motion for partial summary judgment.
IV.

Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against GS Jones Construction,
Inc.
On February 17, 2009, Grazerfiledhis motion for partial summary judgment against GS

Jones Construction, Inc. In the accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer argued that GS
Jones Construction, Inc. received an $80,000 payment for renovation work performed on the
Sayamas' home that should have been subject to Grazer's garnishment of Gordon Jones
Construction. Grazer asserted that Gordon Jones Construction provided the Sayamas a bid for the
renovation work and performed the labor. Grazer submitted, however, that the Sayamas'
payment was made to GS Jones Construction, Inc., rather than Gordon Jones Construction in a
fraudulent attempt to avoid Grazer's garnishment of Gordon Jones Construction.
On April 14, 2009, Jonesfiledhis memorandum in opposition to Grazer's motion. In his
opposing memorandum, Jones acknowledged that Gordon Jones Construction provided the bid
10

Again, it is worth noting that the parties do not dispute the material facts pertinent to the Olsen Trust's attempted
redemptions. The issues before the Court are issues of law regarding the interpretation of Rule 69C of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and applying the undisputed facts to such interpretation. Accordingly, the Court may grant
summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the Olsen Trust's cross motion.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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for the renovation of the Sayamas' residence, but asserted that GS Jones Construct i in, liu knik
tlic piojcu in July 2005 and performed the majority of the work on the home. Jones further
asserted that it is uncertain how much work (ionlon I MK> " on 4tm fion pn formal it HIP
Sayamas' home and thus, a material issue of fact exists as to what portion of the $80,000
payment Gordon. Jones Consti uction is entitled and vv hat amount, if" any, is subject to Grazer's
garnishment. Additionally, Jones filed a supporting affidavit of G. Scott Jones, which discussed
.mini ,tf(ai lied 111v u"h cs fioiii subcontractors and the costs associated with the Sayama project.11
The affidavit also asserted that Grazer was paid $18,000.0 from the Siivamas' p.iynicw in < iS
Jones Construction, Inc. pursuant to his garnishment.
On April 24, 2009, Grazer filed his reply \\u:m ii'miilum in suppoM ol his motion. In his
reply, Grazer asserted that Jones' opposing memorandum did not dispute the fact that Jones and
his son actively <l iv ^ lied tywuu tw\\ .i u\ t miilon I ones Construction into GS Jones Construction,
Inc. Further, Grazer asserted that payments to third-party subcontractors who worked on IL
Savanna project MV niHLV<ml lo whether the transfer of funds was fraudulent. Accordingly,
Grazer contends that there are no material issues of fact regarding \\\K motion :PHI requests l IK;
Court grant him summary judgment in the sum of $80,000, plus interest.
Subsequently, at the May 5, 2009 hearii i y, (fie fuilir, .iijb.iiiilii'iJ Ihis iiiiiiln for decision.

11

On April 24, 2009, Grazer filed a motion to strike the affidavit of G. Scott Jones. In his accompanying supporting
memorandum, Grazer argued that the affidavit contains inadmissible hearsay and that the documentation attached to
the affidavit is insufficient to support the assertion that GS Jones Construction, Inc. took over the Sayama project.
Grazer requested the Court disregard the affidavit in its entirety. On May 4, 2009, Jones filed a memorandum in
opposition to Grazer's motion to strike. In his opposing memorandum, Jones argued that the assertions within his
affidavit are based upon personal knowledge and thus, not hearsay. Upon the Court's review of the affidavit, it
appears that the assertions within are based upon G. Scott Jones' personal knowledge and are not hearsay
statements; however, the attached supporting documentation does not sufficiently demonstrate that GS Jones
Construction, Inc. took the Sayama project over or that Grazer was already paid $ 18,000.00 from the project's
proceeds. Accordingly, while the Court must DENY Grazer's motion to strike, the Court finds that the affidavit
leaves several matters unclear. Specifically, the Courtfindsthat material issues of fact exist regarding the sums
Gordon Jones Construction was duefromthe Sayama project's proceeds, what portion of those sums is subject to
Grazer's garnishment, and whether Grazer received $18,000.00 from the project's proceeds.
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Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only
where 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure for garnishments.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 64D. With regard to what property may be garnished, the Rule provides:
"The maximum portion of disposable earning of an individual subject to
seizure is the lesser of:
(a)(1) 50% of the defendant's disposable earnings for a writ to enforce
payment of a judgment for failure to support defendant children or 25% of
the defendant's disposable earnings for any other judgment; or
(a)(2) the amount by which the defendant's disposable earning for a pay
period exceeds the number of weeks in that pay period multiplied by thirty
times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair Labor
Standards Act in effect at the time the earnings are payable."
Id. at 64D(a) (Emphasis added). The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure defines "earnings" as:
"[Compensation, however denominated, paid or payable to an individual
for personal services, including periodic payment pursuant to a pension or
retirement program. Earning accrue on the last day of the period in which
they were earned."
Id. at 64(a)(5). Further the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure define "disposable earnings" as:
"[T]hat part of earning for a pay period remaining after the deduction of all amounts required by
law to be withheld." Id. at 64(a)(4). Accordingly, and contrary to Grazer's airgument, a valid writ
of garnishment does not enable a party to obtain 100% of the earnings of an individual that is
subject to the garnishment. See Id. at 64D(a).
Here, it is uncertain what portion of the $80,000 Sayama payment that Gordon Jones
Construction is entitled, as Jones' affidavit indicates that GS Jones Construction, Inc. took over
at least a portion of the Sayama project and performed a considerable amount of work. At this
time, it is unknown how much work Gordon Jones Construction performed at the Sayamas'
18

residence. Further, Jones' affidavit states that $50,420.38 of the $80,000 was used ic p\v}
subcontractor lor (heir work on the Sayamas' renovation. Additionally, $6,964.89 of the
$80,000 was used to pay providers of materials l'nr tin* S<n anus" innovation, i 'ontrary to
Grazer's argument, the payment of the material providers and subcontractors does affect the
amount that CM,)/n aumlil uam

h\ i nlm i ii' his garnishment under the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure's definition of "disposable earnings." See Utah R. Civ. P. 64(a"H 4), f»4l)(a).
\ 11 'irttingi y, h- i t in i finds that because it is uncertain how much of the $80,000 paid by the
Sayamas is subject to Grazer's garnishment, a material issue of did exists and summary
judgment on Grazer's motion may not be granted.
Further, while Grazer alleges lli.il tin1 lianstci f >f (li« 'hKU.IKMl was a fraudulent transfer
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Utah Code Ann. §25-6-1 et seq., Grazer's
pleadings and fill* '(-aliot K do m ii t>tablr4i <i prima facie case of fraudulent transfer. Pursuant to
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act:
"A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor ... if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer or obligation; and the debtor: (i) was engaged or was about to
engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the
debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction;
or (ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed
that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due."
Utah Code Ann. §26-6-5(1). To determine "actual intent" under the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfers Act, the Court m,n \«n >nli"i 111« U)\U)\\ ing factors:
(a) the transfer was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control oft
(c) whether the transfer was disclosed oi >"or ^
19

/
l

* - - • msferred after the transfer;

(d) before the transfer was made, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the valued of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to
the value of the asset transferred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or after a substantial debt was incurred; AND
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred
the assets to an insider of the debtor.
See Id. at 25-6-5(2). Thus, the Court'sfindingof an occurrence of afraudulenttransfer is highly
fact sensitive. See Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 163 P.3d 713, 722 (Utah Ct. App. 2007)
("Importantly the existence of fraudulent intent is a factual question, which necessarily involves
weighing the evidence presented and assessing the credibility of witnesses - tasks largely within
the province of the fact-finder.").
Here, Grazer has argued that some of factors listed in Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5(2) are
present in the transfer of the $80,000 payment from the Sayamas. Specifically, Grazer has
asserted that the transfer was to an insider, i.e. Jones' son and Jones' newly formed company,
that Jones has retained possession and control of the transferred funds, and that the transfer was
in anticipation of a judgment being entered in this litigation. However, the Court finds that these
assertions alone, without discussion of the other factors listed within the statute and the
opportunity to weigh and assess the credibility of witnesses and competent evidence presented,
the Court cannot find that Jones transferred the Sayamas' payment with "actual intent" to hinder,
delay, or defraud Grazer of his judgment.
Accordingly, the Courtfindsthat summary judgment on Grazer's motion for partial
summary judgment against GS Jones Construction, Inc. is inappropriate at this time. The Court
20

must therefore DENY Grazer's motion for partial summai \ tinliiii'inif <if.Minsl l iS lour,
Construction, Inc.
V.

Counterclaim Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Garnishee Judgment Against the
Shaffer Law Office or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment Setting Aside
Fraudulent Transfers.
i iii ii'i'hfiufy * '\ .^inw, < na/ri filed Ins motion tor entry of garnishee judgment against

the Shaffer Law Office or for summary judgment setting aside fraudulent transfers In (tie
accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer argued that the Shaffer Law Office responded
inaccurately to his writ of garnishment, served October 5, 2005, by failing la nlaihly I lit1 retainer
paid to it by Jones. Grazer asserted that the retainer is subject to garnishment and that Grazer is
entitled to garnishee judgnitiil a ^ u U the Sh.illVi 1 av Dllin i: foi llui total amount it holds in its
trust account for Jones, $58,452.17 plus interest
The SkitTii 1 aw Office filed ii:> memorandum in opposition to Grazer's motion on
February 24,2009. In its opposing memorandum, the Shaffer Law Office objected lo (ira/ei s
charaetenzal ion < il In Hies" actions as fraudulent transfers, as the Court has not heard nor ruled
upon the same. Next, the Shaffer Law Office argued that no tuia) judgment e\med mi < itioln i k>,
2005, when Grazer served the writ of garnishment, and therefore, the writ was untimely. The
Shaffer Law Office asserted that th<

udgment j n ^

s m a ft e r u n ^ i

jt s

written ruling of April 13, 2006. Regardless, the Shaffer Law Office submitted that its response
to the writ of garnishment 'was arniMii1 -e- low "• hiu\ ?i< I interest in the retainer paid to the law
firm for its services. The Shaffer Law Office then argued that Grazer's motion is until nHy nil l"i
R uk1 MIJ(h)( I) u' II'i1 Utah Rules of Civ il Procedure, which requires a reply to a response to a
writ of garnishment and request for hearing to occur within Irn I i I)) Jays of the response's
service. The Shaffer Law Office noted that Grazer's motion was filed nearly two (2) years after
21

its response was served. Finally, the Shaffer Law Office argued that the settlement agreement
regarding Jones' bankruptcy action discharged Grazer's judgment and, as a result, further
proceedings in this matter to collect the judgment are prohibited.12
On March 10, 2009, Grazerfiledhis reply memorandum in support of his motion. In his
reply, Grazer argued that the issue of when the judgment against Jones became final was
disposed of in the Court's ruling of April 13, 2006. Grazer asserted that a valid judgment and
valid garnishment existed at the time he served the writ of garnishment on the Shaffer Law
Office. Next, Grazer asserted that the Shaffer Law Office's objections to the writ of garnishment
are untimely, and that the Shaffer Law Office should have requested a hearing if it sought to
challenge the writ and assert an interest in the property it held for Jones. Gnizer posited that Rule
64D(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for an entry of a garnishee judgment when a
garnishee responds inaccurately to a writ of garnishment. Grazer submitted that the Shaffer Law
Office should not be allowed to benefit from its inaccurate responses. Finally, Grazer argued that
the settlement agreement of Jones' bankruptcy action specifically excluded Jones' property that
wasfraudulentlytransferred. Grazer then requested the Court enter a garnishee judgment against
the Shaffer Law Office for the total amount held within its trust account for Jones, plus interest.
Subsequently, at the May 5,2009 hearing, the parties submitted this matter for decision.

12

The Shaffer Law Office filed a notice to submit for decision regarding Grazer's motion on March 6, 2009. On
March 10, 2009, Grazer filed a motion for leave to file an untimely reply memorandum in support of his motion. In
his accompanying supporting memorandum, Grazer argued that his reply memorandum was untimely due to the
misleading nature of the title of the Shaffer Law Office's opposing memorandum. The Shaffer Law Office's
memorandum in opposition to Grazer's motion for entry of garnishee judgment or for summary judgment to set
asidefraudulenttransfers was titled "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemptions." The Shaffer Law Office did not oppose Grazer's motion for leave
to file an untimely reply memorandum. Upon review of Grazer's motion, the Court finds that the title of the Shaffer
Law Office's opposing memorandum is misleading, as it refers to one of the other pending motions before the Court
that Grazer had already responded to. Further, the Court finds that the parties will not be prejudiced by the Court
allowing Grazer to file a reply memorandum. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Grazer's motion for leave to file an
untimely reply.
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As a primary consideration, the issue of when the judgment agamsl Jones tia/amc final
c;

was addressed and resolved in the Court's ruling of April 13, 2006. Within that ruling, the Court

v*

j|

explicitly stated several times that Gram's iiidymenl became linal on Api il 13, 2006 Thus, no

8
•;

final judgment existed at the time Grazer served the Shaffer Law Office with the writ of
Hiunishmenl u\\ \ k lulu

i '
J;
^

Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contanplak's thai ,i J\M nishmenl may
occur either after a judgment is entered or prior to the entry of a judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P.
64D(a) ("A writ of garnishment is a\ aiUble niter final iinlf'ineii! or alter the claim has been filed
and prior to judgment."). However, Rule 64D requires compliance with several factors for a preuna' I'MigiiK in '' "I »*" >H -flo >'IM; S<r id at u4l>(h) \pre-fmal judgment writ of garnishment
requires all of the following:
ill iliai I he defendant is indebted to the plaintiff;
(2) that the action is upon a contract;
(3) that payment of the claim has not been secured by a lien upon property in the State of
I Jtah;
(4) that the garnishee possess or controls property of the defendant; AND
(5) that the plaintiff has attached the garnishee fee established by Utah Code Ann. § /K
44, i.e. $10 or $25 depending on whether the garnishment is single or continuing.
See Id at64D(b).
Here, the parties do not dispute whether Grazer complied with the foregoing factors when
he served the writ of garnishment on the Shaffi

:

; also undisputed that

Grazer knew of the retainer that Jones had paid to the Shaffer Law Office for its legal
representation iii i hi s artion .md •< l.tfuf iwMU rs prior to serving the writ. Grazer was informed of
the retainer when he took Jones' deposition on September 14, 2005.
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Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff or defendant to file a
reply to a garnishee's response and request a hearing if it challenges the accuracy of the
garnishee's answers, to wit:
"The plaintiff or defendant may file and serve upon the garnishee a reply
to the answers and request a hearing.... The reply may ... challenge the
accuracy of the answers[.]"
Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(h)(l)(B). Further, under the plain language of Rule 64D(h)(l), "[t]he reply
shall befiledand served within 10 days after service of the answers or amended answers." Id. at
64D(h)(l). Accordingly, the Courtfindsthat the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required Grazer
to havefileda challenge to the Shaffer Law Office's responses within ten (10) days after their
service.
Here, Grazer's motion is clearly untimely under Rule 64D(h)(l), as Grazer filed the
instant motion over two (2) years after the Shaffer Law Office served its responses. However,
Grazer argues that the Shaffer Law Office had a duty to respond accurately to the writ of
garnishment and should have requested a hearing if it asserted an interest in the retainer paid by
Jones. This argument is supported by the Utah Court of Appeals case of Rappleye v. Rappleye.
99 P.3d 348 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). In Rappleye, the Court stated:
"In a garnishment proceeding, the garnishee is typically a neutral party to
the garnishment proceedings... . However, sometimes a garnishee departs
from a neutral position to assert its own claim to the property... . If a
garnishee does assert ownership claims to the property, Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 64D establishes a process for resolving competing claims to the
property made by the judgment creditor, judgment debtor, and garnishee."
Id. at 357-58 (Internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Court's analysis in
Rappleye interpreted an older version of Rule 64D, Rule 69(h)(1), which provided that any party
could request a hearing regarding a claim or interest in judgment debtor's property subject to a
garnishment, to wit:
24

"Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69(h)(1), not only the judgment
debtor, biit 'any other person who owns or claims an interest in the
property subject to execution may request a hearing to claim any
exemption to the execution, or to challenge the issuance of the writ.'"
Id. at 358, fh. 8 (quotingUtah R. Civ. P. 69(h)(1) (1994)) \lw .'nm/nf v(TSinii n\ k\llh: t»4i> does
not contain this language and specifically requires either the plaintiff or the defendant to file a
reply to challenge the accuracy of the jjarnislire's responses See Utah K. (. IV. P. 64D(h)(l).
Indeed, it makes little sense to require the garnishee to file a reply and request for hearing in
response to his i linnwiiiin \HI in .i iviil ol garnishment
Accordingly, the Court rejects Grazer's contention that the Shaffer I .aw Office was
rrqwred f > i iqm »» J hearing regarding the retainer it held, rather than himself, particularly in
light of the fact that Grazer was clearly and undispuloillv ay-, ai c >( I hi. 1* laniii I Ins is further
supported by the Utah Supreme Court discussion of garnishment proceedings in Upper Blue
Bench Irrigation DisL v. i 'nnhi^unl \iii 7 llmkA

/>IP,J

( o , f' i1 M 1048 il'tah 1937), In

Upper Blue Bench Irrigation DisL, the Utah Supreme Court stated in dicta:
"It appears equally as obvious that had the bank answered the writ that
was served that is was in nowise indebted to the district no valid garnishee
judgment could have been rendered against it, in the absence of further
proceedings successfully traversing such answer."
Id. at 1053. Further, in discussing

a garnishment proceeding the Utah

Supreme Court stated:
"The garnishee is merely a stakeholder, having no liability to the garnishor
until a valid judgment is entered against him. The right and power of the
Court to enter a garnishee judgment, therefore, is predicated upon prior
valid proceedings disclosing that the conditions are such that this remedy
has been so proceeded with that the Court's jurisdiction to consummate
such proceedings with a judgment against the garnishee is invoked."
he Court therefore finds that Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required < *•• * or
to file a reply and irqii«\sl for hesn inf.\ uiihin ten (10) days the Shaffer Law Office's responses,

rather than requiring the Shaffer Law Office to request the hearing upon the filing of its
responses to Grazer's writ of garnishment. Accordingly, the Court must DENY Grazer's motion
for garnishee judgment against the Shaffer Law Office as it is untimely.13
Furthermore, even when viewing Grazer's motion as the alternative motion for summary
judgment setting aside fraudulent transfers, the Court must still DENY Grazer's motion. As
stated herein above, to succeed in a cause of action forfraudulenttransfer under the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfers Act, the Court must employ a highly fact sensitive analysis of several
factors to determine whether Jones provided the retainer to the Shaffer Law Office with the
"actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor[.]" Utah Code Ann. §25-65(l)(a).
Here, Grazer's pleadings are devoid of argument pertaining to the factors for finding
"actual intent" as set forth in of Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5(2). Further, since the Court's analysis
of afraudulenttransfer claim is highly fact sensitive, the Court finds that material issues of fact
exist as to whether Jones' had an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Grrazer when he
provided the disputed retainer to the Shaffer Law Office. The Court notes, however, that from
the record before it and the evidence presented herein, Grazer will be hard pressed to make such
a showing with regard to the retainer paid to the Shaffer Law Office. Accordingly, Court must
DENY Grazer's motion for summary judgment setting aside fraudulent transfers.

13

Rule 64D also provides that "the court may deem the reply timely if filed before notice of sale of the property or
before the property is delivered to the plaintiff." Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(h)(l). This provision of the Rule would allow
the Court to consider Grazer's motion although it is untimely, as the Shaffer Law Office's trust account still contains
funds from the retainer paid to it by Jones. However, because Jones' bankruptcy action discharged Grazer's
judgment against Jones, the Court cannot consider Grazer's untimely motion to reopen his judgment against Jones
through the garnishment of the Shaffer Law Office retainer. Accordingly, the only argument that would allow
Grazer to succeed on his motion is that the retainer was afraudulenttransfer of Jones' property.
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CONCLUSION
if

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: (1) DENIES Allen Grazer's Motion for Equitable

\t

n

Si

i;

Lien and OaVr of FV>reolosuiv (Malm 1 I;H im), (jf I)|«N1!"S Defendant Grazer's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment regarding Invalidity of Attempted Redemption'. ( \)<W \N1> I he
Olsen I rust s Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (4) DENIES Grazer's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against (iS lours f "oust

DENIES Counterclaim

Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Garnishee Judgment Against the Shaffer Law Office or, in the
Alternative, , for, tummarv

IIKIJIIIIUII

Selling Aside Fraudulent Transfers.

The Court directs the Olsen Trust and Grazer to transfer the funds and execute the
'louimenis necw.ii v to effectuate the July 8, 2008 attempted redemption consistent with this
Ruling. The Court further directs Jones to prepare ami subiml an onler that u» i'on,sislijnl with .and
reflects this Ruling.
Date signed:

ff

y-Ig 'Q f

.

DISTRICT COlfiRT JU0OE
MICHAEL G.ALLPHI

j&gsm,
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ADDENDUM "B"
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Joseph M.R. Covey (7492)
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RECEIVED AUG 1 2 2009
Phone: 801-532-7840
Fax:801-532-7750
Attorneys for Gordon Jones and his Redemption Right Assignee, Ludvig D. Olsen and Jackie M.
Olsen, as trustees of the Ludvig D. Olsen and Jackie M Olsen Trust
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH
GORDON A. JONES, AN INDIVIDUAL, and
RICHARD H. BARNEY, AN INDIVIDUAL,

Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants,
v.

[PROPOSED] ORDER ON CROSS
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON REDEMPTION
Civil No. 020700570

ALLEN F. GRAZER, AN INDIVIDUAL,

Judge Michael G. Allphin

Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff.

Defendant Allen F. Grazer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity
of Attempted Redemption and the Olsen Trust's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
came before the Court for hearing on May 5,2009. Lincoln W. Hobbs appeared on behalf of
Allen F. Grazer ("Defendant"). Joseph M.R. Covey appeared on behalf of Ludvig D. Olsen and
Jackie M. Olsen, as trustees of the Ludvig D. Olsen and Jackie M. Olsen Trust and as the
assignee of Gordon Jones' redemption rights ("Olsen Trust"). At the conclusion of the hearing,
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the Court took the matter under advisement and on June 16, 2009 issued a Ruling on Motions
Pending at May 5, 2009 Hearing (the "Ruling").
For the reasons stated in the Court's Ruling, the Court HEREBY ORDERS:
1.

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Invalidity of
Attempted Redemption is DENIED.

2.

The Olsen Trust's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

3.

On July 8,2008, the Olsen Trust substantially complied with the redemption
procedures of Rule 69C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it provided
Defendant's counsel, who was acting on behalf of his client, with (a) a copy of the
Assignment; (b) a check made payable to Plaintiffs counsel in the amount of
$210; and (c) a certificate of redemption.

4.

Following receipt of the $210, Defendant shall promptly execute and deliver to
the Olsen Trust a certificate of redemption in accordance with Rule 69C(g) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, containing, among other things, a detailed
description of the real property and a statement that all right, title, and interest of
the Defendant in the property is conveyed to the Olsen Trust.

5.

The Olsen Trust shall promptly pay Defendant the redemption price of $210.00
by delivering to Defendant's counsel, Lincoln W. Hobbs, a check for $210.00
made payable to Defendant.

6.

The Clerk of Court shall release to the Olsen Trust the $2,465.00 that was
deposited into the Court on or about August 15, 2008.

7.

The Court has determined that there is no just reason for delaying the entry of this
Order and hereby certifies this Order as afinaljudgment with respect to all of the
claims involving the Olsens and the redemption, in accordance with Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS SO ORDERED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of
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BY THE COURT:

'Honorable Michael
Second District Co

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
HOBBS & OLSON

Lin6>fa W. Hobbs
SHAFFER LAW OFFICE, P.C.

2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August / / , 2009, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
(PROPOSED) ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
REDEMPTION was served via United States first class mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Lincoln W. Hobbs
Margaret H. Olson
Julie Ladle
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.

466 E 500 S, Ste 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
David Shaffer
Shaffer Law Office
562 S Main St
Bountiful, UT 84010
Nu-Trend Electric Company
245 West 300 South
Bountiful, UT 84010

Stephen F. Noel
Smith Knowles PC
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84403
Scott Sessions
289 West Tobe Drive
Centerville, UT 84014
S. Austin Johnson
Johnson Law Associates
251 West River Park Drive, Suite
100
Provo, Utah 84604
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